Citizens of Idaho
The Truth, The Fact
Judicial v. Judiciary
The Lie and the Spin of CORPORATISM
The following is an example of a QUO WARRANTO sent in to the AG then followed up on; which he stated he did not receive the paperwork, even though it was sent certified mail and verified received.
Plaintiff(s)
Citizens of Idaho (U1777)
“On Behalf of the people
of the state of Idaho”
(Defendants)
City of Burley
Cassia County
State of Idaho
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMES NOW, Citizens of Idaho (U1777) M. Esquibel member with clean hands, with dejure standing of the rightful government on behalf of the sovereign county of Cassia and the people domiciled within the Constitutional boundaries of the state of Idaho, hereby make this claim of right as described under IC 53-707; demand an investigation by an independent team against the employees and public officers of these CORPORATE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS known as CASSIA COUNTY EIN # 028433647, CITY OF BURLEY EIN # 182046151 and that CORPORATE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION STATE OF IDAHO EIN # 82-6000852, 82-6000952 of this State of Idaho for the following good cause:
The importance of the existence of the state of Idaho, a Sovereign state among the Nation, whose people and free inhabitants are endowed with Natural, Inherent, Unalienable, Imprescriptible, Primary, Absolute Rights, and with privileges and immunities that are guaranteed by organic law, some of which are secured by the Constitution for the United States of America (1789), State of Idaho Constitution (1890), cannot be trivialized. The state government’s actions for the protection of said Rights are to be executed with specific performance pursuant to the Statutes of Fraud and Perjuries.
Excerpts from Dissolution of Government
Sec. 212. Besides this over-turning from without, governments are dissolved from within, First, When the legislative is altered. Civil society being a state of peace, amongst those who are of it, from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage, which they have provided in their legislative, for the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them, it is in their legislative, that the members of a commonwealth are united, and combined together into one coherent living body. This is the soul that gives form, life, and unity, to the common-wealth: from hence the several members have their mutual influence, sympathy, and connexion: and therefore, when the legislative is broken, or dissolved, dissolution and death follows: for the essence and union of the society consisting in having one will, the legislative, when once established by the majority, has the declaring, and as it were keeping of that will. The constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society, whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union, under the direction of persons, and bonds of laws, made by persons authorized thereunto, by the consent and appointment of the people, without which no one man, or number of men, amongst them, can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest. When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without authority would impose any thing upon them. Every one is at the disposure of his own will, when those who had, by the delegation of the society, the declaring of the public will, are excluded from it, and others usurp the place, who have no such authority or delegation.
Sec. 227. In both the fore-mentioned cases, when either the legislative is changed, or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were constituted; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion: for if any one by force takes away the established legislative of any society, and the laws by them made, pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage, which every one had consented to, for a peaceable decision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state of war amongst them. They, who remove, or change the legislative, take away this decisive power, which no body can have, but by the appointment and consent of the people; and so destroying the authority which the people did, and no body else can set up, and introducing a power which the people hath not authorized, they actually introduce a state of war, which is that of force without authority: and thus, by removing the legislative established by the society, (in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united, as to that of their own will) they untie the knot, and expose the people a-new to the state of war, And if those, who by force take away the legislative, are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been shewn, can be no less esteemed so; when they, who were set up for the protection, and preservation of the people, their liberties and properties, shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away; and so they putting themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace, are properly, and with the greatest aggravation, rebellantes, rebels.
--Dissolution of Government, John Locke.
We the People of the County of Cassia demand a
Grand Jury Investigation
Opinion 1:
In discussing that power and unique independence granted to the grand jury, the HYPERLINK "http://www.evilconservativeonline.com/2009/03/what-power-does-common-law-grand-jury.html" United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 at 48 (1992), Justice Scalia, delivering the opinion of the court, laid down the law of the land:
"'[R]ooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history," Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 490 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result), the grand jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been textually assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three Articles. It "`is a constitutional fixture in its own right.'" United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (CA9 1977) (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 58, 70, n. 54, 487 F.2d 700, 712, n. 54 (1973)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). ' "
Scalia also stated, that "the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside..." Id.
And finally, to seal the deal, Scalia hammered the point home:
"In fact, the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61 (1906); G. Edwards, The Grand Jury 28-32 (1906). Although the grand jury normally operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm's length. Judges' direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 6(a). [504 U.S. 36, 48] "
This miraculous quote says it all, "...the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people." The Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, gives rise to a FOURTH BRANCH of Government, THE GRAND JURY. We the people have been charged with oversight of the government in our roles as grand jurors.
Opinion 2:
I want to draw your attention to a law review article, CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW, Vol. 33, No. 4 1999-2000, 821, IF IT'S NOT A RUNAWAY, IT'S NOT A REAL GRAND JURY by Roger Roots, J.D.
"In addition to its traditional role of screening criminal cases for prosecution, common law grand juries had the power to exclude prosecutors from their presence at any time and to investigate public officials without governmental influence. These fundamental powers allowed grand juries to serve a vital function of oversight upon the government. The function of a grand jury to ferret out government corruption was the primary purpose of the grand jury system in ages past."
An article appearing in American Juror, the newsletter of the American Jury Institute and the Fully Informed Jury Association, citing the famed American jurist, Joseph Story, explained :
"An indictment is a written accusation of an offence preferred to, and presented, upon oath, as true, by a grand jury, at the suit of the government. An indictment is framed by the officers of the government, and laid before the grand jury. Presentments, on the other hand, are the result of a jury’s independent action:
'A presentment, properly speaking, is an accusation, made by a grand jury of its own mere motion, of an offence upon its own observation and knowledge, or upon evidence before it, and without any bill of indictment laid before it at the suit of the government. Upon a presentment, the proper officer of the court must frame an indictment, before the party accused can be put to answer it.' "
Back to the Creighton Law Review:
"A 'runaway' grand jury, loosely defined as a grand jury which resists the accusatory choices of a government prosecutor, has been virtually eliminated by modern criminal procedure. Today's "runaway" grand jury is in fact the common law grand jury of the past. Prior to the emergence of governmental prosecution as the standard model of American HYPERLINK "http://www.evilconservativeonline.com/2009/03/what-power-does-common-law-grand-jury.html" criminal justice, all grand juries were in fact "runaways," according to the definition of modern times; they operated as completely independent, self-directing bodies of inquisitors, with power to pursue unlawful conduct to its very source, including the government itself."
So, it's clear that the Constitution intended to give the grand jury power to instigate criminal charges, and this was especially true when it came to government oversight. But something strange happened on the way to the present. That power was eroded by a lie enacted by the legislative branch. The 5th Amendment to the Constitution still contains the same words, but if you sit on a grand jury and return a "presentment" today, the prosecutor must sign it or it probably won't be allowed to stand by the judge and the criminal charges you have brought to the court's attention will be swept away. And the reason for this can be found in a legislative lie of epic proportions.
Mr. Roots weighs in again:
"In 1946, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted, codifying what had previously been a vastly divergent set of common law procedural rules and regional customs.[86] In general, an effort was made to conform the rules to the contemporary state of HYPERLINK "http://www.evilconservativeonline.com/2009/03/what-power-does-common-law-grand-jury.html" federal criminal practice.[87] In the area of federal grand jury practice, however, a remarkable exception was allowed. The drafters of Rules 6 and 7, which loosely govern federal grand juries, denied future generations of what had been the well-recognized powers of common law grand juries: powers of unrestrained investigation and of independent declaration of findings. The committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided no outlet for any document other than a prosecutor-signed indictment. In so doing, the drafters at least tacitly, if not affirmatively, opted to ignore explicit constitutional language."[88]"
Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP):
"An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment..."
No mention of "presentments" can be found in Rule 7. But they are mentioned in Note 4 of the Advisory Committee Notes on the Rules:
"4. Presentment is not included as an additional type of formal accusation, since presentments as a method of instituting prosecutions are obsolete, at least as concerns the Federal courts."
The American Juror published the following commentary with regards to Note 4:
"[W]hile the writers of the federal rules made provisions for indictments, they made none for presentments. This was no oversight. According to Professor Lester B. Orfield, a member of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, the drafters of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 6 decided the term presentment should not be used, even though it appears in the Constitution. Orfield states [22 F.R.D. 343, 346]:
'There was an annotation by the Reporter on the term presentment as used in the Fifth Amendment. It was his conclusion that the term should not be used in the new rules of criminal procedure. Retention might encourage the use of the run-away grand jury as the grand jury could act from their own knowledge or observation and not only from charges made by the United States attorney. It has become the practice for the United States Attorney to attend grand jury hearings, hence the use of presentments have been abandoned.' "
That's a fascinating statement: "Retention might encourage...the grand jury [to] act from their own knowledge or observation." God forbid, right America? The nerve of these people. They have the nerve to put on the record that they intended to usurp our Constitutional power, power that was intended by the founding fathers, in their incredible wisdom, to provide us with oversight over tyrannical government.
And so they needed a spin term to cast aspersions on that power. The term they chose was, "runaway grand jury", which is nothing more than a Constitutionally mandated grand jury, aware of their power, and legally exercising that power to hold the federal beast in check, as in "checks and balances".
The lie couldn't be inserted into the Constitution, so they put it in a statute and then repeated it. And scholars went on to repeat it, and today, as it stands, the grand jury has effectively been lied into the role of submissive puppet of the US Attorney or COUNTY and STATE CORPORATE MAGISTRATE(S), SHERIFF(S) and PROSECUTING ATTORNEY(S).
The below definitions will remain facts, unless a controverted sworn statement by the attorney general rebuts such definitions with findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Definitions:
1. city of Burley “ Constitutional spelling” governed by Constitutional rule of law / pursuant to law
2. City of Burley “ Municipal spelling” governed by Constitutional rule of law / pursuant to law or COLOR OF LAW and or IDAPA
3. CITY OF BURLEY “ FULL CORPORATE CAPACITY” governed by COLOR OF LAW and or IDAPA
4. county of Cassia “ Constitutional spelling” governed by Constitutional rule of law
5. Cassia County “ Municipal spelling” governed by Constitutional rule of law / pursuant to law or COLOR OF LAW and or IDAPA
6. CASSIA COUNTY “ FULL CORPORATE CAPACITY” governed by COLOR OF LAW and or IDAPA
7. state of Idaho “Constitutional spelling” governed by Constitutional rule of law
8. State of Idaho “ Municipal spelling” governed by Constitutional rule of law / pursuant to law or COLOR OF LAW and or IDAPA
9. STATE OF IDAHO “ FULL CORPORATE CAPACITY” governed by COLOR OF LAW and or IDAPA
a "law enforcement officer" shall be defined as any court personnel, sheriff, constable, peace officer, state police officer, correctional, probation or parole official, prosecuting attorney, city attorney, attorney general, or their employees or agents, or any other person charged with the duty of enforcement of the criminal, traffic or penal laws of this state or any other law enforcement personnel or peace officer as defined in chapter 51, title 19, Idaho Code.
CORPORATE NAME AVAILABILITY = IDAPA 34:04:02 Letters of the English Alphabet includes only upper case, or capital letters; no distinction as to type face or font is recognized. (7-1-93)
True Name = IC 53-503 When applied to an individual, the name which the individual uses to bind himself or herself to legal obligations, or to obtain privileges, licenses or benefits from government. The true name will include the surname and some combination of given names or initials, and may include other identifiers such as "Jr.," "3d" or "III."
CORPORATE BIRTH CERTIFICATE is the one recommended under IC 39-245 termed as Certified copy by the IDAHO VITAL RECORDS as shown on the form IDAHO VITAL STATISTICS CERTIFICATE REQUEST.
True Name / Patronymic Name is the one recommended under IC 39-249 termed as Certified photocopy by the IDAHO VITAL RECORDS as shown on the form IDAHO VITAL STATISTICS CERTIFICATE REQUEST.
IDAPA = Idaho Administrative Procedure Act
The above definitions will remain facts, unless a controverted sworn statement by the attorney general rebuts such definitions with finding of fact and conclusions of law.
According to the facts in evidence, it is indisputable, irrefutable and incontrovertible that the employees and elected officials of CITY OF BURLEY, CASSIA COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO in numerous cases “CV-2007-527, CR-2007-533, CR-2008-955, CR-2010-5787, CV-2010-0760, CR-2010-4808” think and acted above and/or outside the scope of the rule of law, which nullifies the general jurisdiction of the State of Idaho. Instead of devising and applying solutions for the people, that STATE OF IDAHO JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND SPECIAL MASTERS have, by machinations of the law / color of law, have become tyrants and pettifoggers in concert with the members of the CORPORATE DEMOCRACY which is inapposite to our guaranteed Republic form of government as stated in the Idaho Constitution and United States Constitution.
The previous decisions and judgements by any and all “Party or Parties” of the CITY OF BURLEY, CASSIA COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO inter alia, seems to qualify as a criminal conspiracy known as public racketeering pursuant to Idaho Statute 18-1701, which provides,
Idaho Statute: 18-1701. Criminal conspiracy defined. If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of Idaho, and one (1) or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall be punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of the crime or offenses that each combined to commit.
While Idaho Statute states other Penalties under 18-7804:
Prohibited activities -- Penalties. (a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property. Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony.
(b) It is unlawful for any person to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity in order to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise or real property. Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony.
(c) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of such enterprise by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity. Whoever violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a felony.
(d) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a) through (c) of this section. Whoever violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a felony.
(e) Whoever violates the provisions of this act is punishable by a fine not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) and/or imprisonment not to exceed a term of fourteen (14) years in the Idaho state penitentiary.
(f) Upon a conviction of a violation under the provisions of this chapter, the court may order restitution for all costs and expenses of prosecution and investigation, pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth in section 37-2732(k), Idaho Code.
(g) In addition to any other penalties prescribed by law, whoever violates any provisions of this act shall forfeit to the state of Idaho:
(1) Any interest acquired or maintained in violation of the racketeering act; and
(2) Any interest in, security of, claim against or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted or participated in the conduct of in violation of the provisions of the racketeering act.
(h) In any action brought by the state under the racketeering act, the district court shall have jurisdiction to enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or to take such other actions, including, but not limited to, the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with any property or other interest subject to forfeiture under the provisions of this section, as it shall deem proper.
Upon conviction of a person under the provisions of this section, the court shall authorize the attorney general or the proper prosecuting attorney to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under the provisions of this section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons. If a property right or other interest is not exercisable or transferable for value by the convicted person, it shall expire and shall not revert to the convicted person. [History: [18-7804, added 1981]
The state supreme court and the state court in general jurisdiction must provide the proper oath and instruction when any member domiciled within the boundaries of the Idaho Republic, state of Idaho, with proper standing proclaimed, absent a sworn controverted statement inapposite to such individual determination placing a people outside of the CORPORATE STATUS as described in the 37th Congress Session 2 chapter 119, 1862, defining a person as a corporation.
This also brings forth crucial obedience of such by the presumption of legalities known as color of law. It appears that, due to the severity and consequences of the denial of the proper administration of justice, this State of Idaho activities constitute prima facie violations of your own “criminal laws and policies” after “as denominated in 4 U.S.C. § 112; and as provided by 18. USC § § 241 and 242.”
The only legislative intent for Constitutional magistrates / judges is within IC 1-2221 and has been changed to prevent the use of Constitutionality which is bound by the use of the true name.
The Citizens of Idaho (U1777) and domiciled free inhabitants of the state of Idaho are re-activating our guaranteed republic form of government, for which our founding fathers and others have fought and died, free from CORPORATE ignorance, arrogance and lack of respect. It is an affront and a disgrace to the State of Idaho judiciary which is a safe guard of due process of law that the fallacious JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND SPECIAL MASTERS have the nerve to even call themselves such while continually turning their back on the people of the state and the rule of law governed by the Constitution of the state and United States.
Question 1. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that any and or all Senior Judges, due to his or her failure to take the required Oath of Office prescribed in Idaho Code 1-2221, are not qualified to enter into the duties of office? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 2. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General admit that any and or all Senior Judges, due to his or her failure to take the required Oath of Office proscribed in Idaho Code 1-2221 have committed an act of judicial misconduct by not maintaining redress for the people domiciled within the state of Idaho boundaries? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 3. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that any and or all rulings, decisions and orders issued by Senior Judges, due to his or her failure to take the required Oath of Office prescribed in Idaho Code 1-2221, are null and void ab initio? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 4. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that, due to its allowance of ineligible judges to preside over cases of law and equity, STATE OF IDAHO in general jurisdiction is discriminating against the freedom of religious practice of our members, and of our considered members? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 5. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that, since the Oath of Office requires the applicant to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Idaho that senior judges who have failed to take the proper oath are not required and or unable to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Idaho due to the CORPORATE standing of the STATE OF IDAHO AND CORPORATE NAME IMPOSED? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 6. If, arguendo, a Senior Judge was somehow, by alternative and/or unlawful means, deemed “eligible” to occupy the “office of senior judge” de facto, despite his or her failure to take the required Oath of Office subsection (7) of IC 1-2221, and acted in dereliction of the duties of his or her office. Any unrebutted facts clearly demonstrate, Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that he or she has committed acts of judicial misconduct? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 7. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that the Judicial Council and Masters, routinely issue unacceptable non-responses and dismissals to the judicial complaints made by the people of the state? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 8. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that the Executive Director of the Idaho Judicial Council, JAMES D. CARLSON is signing off on complaints when he does not have an Oath of Office for the Judicial Council on record with the Idaho Secretary of State prior to 10/10/ 2012? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 9. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that the Executive Director of the Idaho Judicial Council, JAMES D. CARLSON has been deemed to be above or beyond the application of and/or subjection to the Idaho Statute prescribing and requiring an Oath of Office prior to 10/10/ 2012? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 10. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that RONALD J. WILPER, who was appointed by the Idaho State Bar, which is a “private corporation,” not a State private corporation, does not have an Oath of Office on file with the Idaho Secretary of State pursuant to Idaho Code 1-2101 prior to 10/10/ 2012? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 11. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that RONALD J. WILPER, who was appointed by the Idaho State Bar, which is a “private corporation,” not a State private corporation, does not have a letter of consent on record from the Idaho Senate prior to 10/10/ 2012? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 12. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that RONALD J. WILPER has been deemed to be above or beyond the application of and/or subjection to the Idaho Statute prescribing and requiring an Oath of Office prior to 10/10/ 2012? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 13. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that THOMAS H. BORRESEN, a SPECIAL MASTER, has failed to file an Oath of Office required and prescribed by law prior to 10/10/ 2012? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 14. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that THOMAS H. BORRESEN, a SPECIAL MASTER, does not have a letter of consent on record from the Idaho Senate as required by law prior to 10/10/ 2012? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 15. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that THOMAS H. BORRESEN has been deemed to be above or beyond the application of and/or subjection to the Idaho Statute prescribing and requiring an Oath of Office prior to 10/10/ 2012? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 16. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree that no education classes, training or instruction have been provided by the State of Idaho to implement the proper administration of justice and/or to direct the performance of Idaho judges with regard to Citizens domiciled in the state of Idaho who have proclaimed their rightful status and standing as sovereigns in the guaranteed republic form of government as expressed and guaranteed in the Organic Act of the state of Idaho? If you do not answer, the answer will be deemed to be “YES.”
Question 17. Does the State of Idaho Attorney General agree since the Judicial Branch and that STATE OF IDAHO SUPREME COURT oversees the process of all Senior Judges, that the justices or any other party or parties failed in maintaing the legislative intent as described in IC 1-2221?
Question 18. Does a Citizen of Idaho member or considered member have a right at any time to invoke Idaho statute IC 19-202(a) to protect his or her real property as defined under IC 55-101 from the CORPORATE CITY, COUNTY and STATE.
Question 19. Does a Citizen of Idaho member or considered member have a right at any time to invoke Idaho statute IC 19-202(a) and solemnly declare there domicile of choice and at any time to invoke Idaho statute IC 55-401 once fraud is realized to protect his or her personal property as defined under IC 55-102 from the CORPORATE CITY, COUNTY and STATE.
That CORPORATE CITY OF BURLEY, that CASSIA COUNTY and that STATE OF IDAHO continue to fraud the people of the state of Idaho whether called intrinsic or extrinsic misrepresentation of the facts governed by the rule of law and or pursuant to law of the Constitutional city, county of Cassia, and this State of Idaho. It is to be noted that the only true Constitutional Judicial authority who may have preside over jurisdiction of this particular case(s) is the Senior Judge as stated in IC 1-2221(7) which the CORPORATE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO has changed under rules which violates the defendants right of due process within the state of Idaho.
Additional Information:
Clearfield Doctrine
The Clearfield Doctrine is explicit and it is stare decisis. The corporation known as CITY OF BURLEY, CASSIA COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO and/or State of Idaho is listed as a “CORPORATION – FOR PROFIT” in the DUN AND BRADSTREET BUSINESS ENTITY database and is, therefore, “an entity entirely separate from government” with no power, authority or jurisdiction over the Plaintiff.
“ . . . the government descended to the level of a mere private corporation and takes on the character of a mere private citizen . . . For the purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as an entity entirely separate from government.” Bank of U.S. v. Planters Bank, 9 Wheat. 22 U.S. 904, U.S. v. Erie Ry Co., 106 U.S. 327; Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
“When governments enter the world of commerce, they are subject to the same burdens as any private firm or corporation.” U.S. v. Burr. 309 U.S. 22; See 22 U.S.C.A. 286e. Bank of U.S. v. Planters Bank of Georgia. 6 L. Ed. (9 Wheat) 244; 22 U.S.C.A. 286 et. Seq., C.R.S. 11-60-103.
Tacit Consent
The theory of an implicit social contract holds that by remaining in the territory controlled by some government, people give consent to be governed. This consent is what gives legitimacy to the government. Philosopher HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roderick_Long"Roderick Long argues that this is a case of HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Question_begging"question begging, because the argument has to presuppose its conclusion:
I think that the person who makes this argument is already assuming that the government has some legitimate jurisdiction over this territory. And then they say, well, now, anyone who is in the territory is therefore agreeing to the prevailing rules. But they’re assuming the very thing they're trying to prove – namely that this jurisdiction over the territory is legitimate. If it's not, then the government is just one more group of people living in this broad general geographical territory. But I've got my property, and exactly what their arrangements are I don't know, but here I am in my property and they don't own it – at least they haven't given me any argument that they do – and so, the fact that I am living in "this country" means I am living in a certain geographical region that they have certain pretensions over – but the question is whether those pretensions are legitimate. You can’t assume it as a means to proving it.
An answer to this argument is that a society which has effective dominion over a territory, that is, a HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State"state, is the HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty"sovereign over that territory, and therefore the true, legal owner of all of it. This is actually the theory of law for HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real_property"real property in every country. What individuals can own is not the land itself, but an HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estate_(law)"estate in the land, that is, a transferrable right to use and exclude others from use. The true owner is the sovereign or supreme lawmaking authority, because it can make and enforce laws that restrict what one can do on one's estate. --Roderick Long. HYPERLINK "http://www.mises.org/etexts/longanarchism.pdf"Libertarian Anarchism: Responses to Ten Objections, Section (1); from the Principles of John Locke
Any member(s) or considered member(s) of Citizens of Idaho (U1777) did not, have not, and will not ever waive his or her Right to submit his or her “person” JOHN DOE OR JANE DOE known and described under CORPORATE NAME AVAILABILITY “IDAPA 34:04:02” which is fraudulently imposed by the CORPORATE POLITICAL SUBDIVISION of the DEMOCRACY, STATE OF IDAHO governed under the color of law and USC Title 4 Section 112.
Those de facto Idaho COURTS have declared that Defendants and Accused persons have the right to “representation” or the right “to be represented.” Nowhere in the Constitution of the United States or the Bill of Rights do the terms “representation” or “represented” appear; therefore, the nature of the STATE OF IDAHO COURTS and any of the instant cases must be defined by the appearance of the terms “representation” or “represented” in the Laws of the United States passed in pursuance to the Constitution as provided by Article VI of the National Constitution in declaring the “supreme law of the land.”
This reference is found in 10 USC § 838 - Art. 38. Duties of trial counsel and defense counsel which provides,
(a) The trial counsel of a general or special court-martial shall prosecute in the name of the United States, and shall, under the direction of the court, prepare the record of the proceedings.
(b)
(1) The accused has the right to be represented in his defense before a general or special court-martial or at an investigation under section HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/832" \o "§ 832 - Art. 32. Investigation" 832 of this title (article 32) as provided in this subsection.
(2) The accused may be represented by civilian counsel if provided by him.
(3) The accused may be represented—
(A) by military counsel detailed under section HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/827" \o "§ 827 - Art. 27. Detail of trial counsel and defense counsel" 827 of this title (article 27); or
(B) by military counsel of his own selection if that counsel is reasonably available (as determined under regulations prescribed under paragraph (7)).
(4) If the accused is represented by civilian counsel, military counsel detailed or selected under paragraph (3) shall act as associate counsel unless excused at the request of the accused.
(5) Except as provided under paragraph (6), if the accused is represented by military counsel of his own selection under paragraph (3)(B), any military counsel detailed under paragraph (3)(A) shall be excused.
(6) The accused is not entitled to be represented by more than one military counsel. However, the person authorized under regulations prescribed under section HYPERLINK "http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/827" \o "§827 - Art. 27. Detail of trial counsel and defense counsel" 827 of this title (article 27) to detail counsel, in his sole discretion—
(A) may detail additional military counsel as assistant defense counsel; and
(B) if the accused is represented by military counsel of his own selection under paragraph (3)(B), may approve a request from the accused that military counsel detailed under paragraph (3)(A) act as associate defense counsel.
(7) The Secretary concerned shall, by regulation, define “reasonably available” for the purpose of paragraph (3)(B) and establish procedures for determining whether the military counsel selected by an accused under that paragraph is reasonably available. Such regulations may not prescribe any limitation based on the reasonable availability of counsel solely on the grounds that the counsel selected by the accused is from an armed force other than the armed force of which the accused is a member. To the maximum extent practicable, such regulations shall establish uniform policies among the armed forces while recognizing the differences in the circumstances and needs of the various armed forces. The Secretary concerned shall submit copies of regulations prescribed under this paragraph to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. [Emphasis added].
It is indisputable, irrefutable, and incontrovertible, by the language in the above Statute and by the displaying of the gold-fringed flag in the courtroom of the above-captioned COURT, that the STATE is attempting to subject Real Party(s) in Interest, William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey, to a Court Martial. William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey, are NOT a member(s) of any arm of the military forces of the United States and is NOT a member of any of the three classes of the militia of the state of Idaho and is therefore not subject to such proceedings. Idaho Code 46-103 is explicit:
TITLE 46
MILITIA AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
CHAPTER 1
STATE MILITIA -- ORGANIZATION AND STAFF
46-103. State militia -- Division into classes. The militia of the state of Idaho shall be divided into three (3) classes, to wit:
The national guard, the organized militia, and the unorganized militia. The national guard shall consist of enlisted personnel between the ages of seventeen (17) and sixty-four (64), organized and equipped and armed as provided in the national defense act, and of commissioned officers between the ages of eighteen (18)and sixty-four (64) years, who shall be appointed and commissioned by the governor as commander-in-chief, in conformity with the provisions of the national defense act, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and as authorized by the provisions of this act. The organized militia shall include any portion of the unorganized militia called into service by the governor, and not federally recognized. The unorganized militia shall include all of the militia of the state of Idaho not included in the national guard or the organized militia.
History:
[(46-103) 1927, ch. 261, sec. 3, p. 510; I.C.A., sec. 45-103; am. 1957, ch. 174, sec. 2, p. 312.]
References to the flag of the United States are also explicit:
4 USC § 1 - Flag; stripes and stars on
The flag of the United States shall be thirteen horizontal stripes, alternate red and white; and the union of the flag shall be forty-eight stars, white in a blue field. --Also see 61 Stat. 642, July 30,1947, ch. 389. 4 U.S.C.A.1.
On August 21, 1959 Dwight David Eisenhower issued executive order 10834. The order was subsequently published in the Federal Register and was not challenged by the legislative branch; thus it became law by default and promulgated in Fed. Regist. 24 No. 166, P.6365 - 6367.
It states that,
“A military flag is a flag that resembles the regular flag of the United States, except that it has a yellow fringe bordering three sides.”
The president of the United States may designate this alteration, but only in his capacity as commander-in-chief and he must set forth such alteration in a presidential proclamation:
“Any rule or custom pertaining to the display of the flag of the United States of America, set forth herein, may be altered, modified, or repealed, or additional rules with respect thereto may be prescribed, by the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, whenever he deems it to be appropriate or desirable; and any such alteration or additional rule shall be set forth in a proclamation.” –4 U.S.C. 10, Modification of rules and customs by President.
“Flag Martial: The placing of a fringe on the national flag, the dimensions of the flag, and the arrangement of the stars and stripes are at the discretion of the president as commander in chief of the army and navy.” --34 Ops. Atty Gen. 483.
“The use of such a fringe is prescribed in current Army Regulation no. 260-10.” --34 Ops. Atty. . Gen. 483, 485.
“Ancient custom sanctions the use of fringe on regimental colors and standards, but there seems to be no good reason or precedent for its use on other flags.” --The Adjutant General of the Army, March 28, 1924, (1925); 34 Ops. Atty. Gen. 483, 485.
It is undisputed that if an American flag is displayed with a yellow fringe on three sides, in any place or location, such as a courtroom, that the place of display is under Admiralty/Maritime and/or martial law because a military flag is present. Thus, if such a flag is displayed in a courtroom, that courtroom is under military martial law not constitutional Law. This matter is made abundantly clear by U.S. Army reg. # AR 840-10 Oct 1, 1979:
“The flag is trimmed on three sides with a fringe of gold 2 -inch wide, such flags are only flown indoors, only in military courtrooms.”
Title 4 U.S.C. 3 provides that anything put on the title 4 U.S.C., 1, 2 American Flag such as gold fringe MUTILATES the Flag and carries a one-year prison term. This is confirmed by the authority of title 36 U.S.C. 176(g). The gold fringe is a fourth color and represents "color of law" jurisdiction and when placed on the title 4 U.S.C. 1, 2 Flag, mutilates the Flag and suspends the Constitution and establishes "color of law" jurisdiction to which William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey are not subject and does not consent to but to which he strenuously objects. Absent any offer of proof that William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey is a member(s) of the military or of the state militia, these individuals cases must “should have been” terminated immediately.
As provided by title 36 U.S.C. 173 and Army Regulation 840-10, chapter 2-1(b), the Flag of the united States of America is defined and described in title 4 U.S.C. 1, 2. Civilians must use the title 4 U.S.C. 1, 2 Flag (see title 36 U.S.C. 173 and Army Regulation 840-10, chapter 2-7) and when military flags are displayed by Army Regulation 840-10, chapter 2 and title 36 U.S.C. 175.
Proper display of the Flag is covered in 36 USCS §§ 141 et seq.; 35 Am Jur 2d, Flag §§ 1, 7; 61 Stat. 642 (July 30, 1947) and; R.S. § 1792.
The gold-fringed flag only stands inside military courts that sit in summary court martial proceedings against civilians and such courts are governed in part by local rules, but more especially by “The Manual of Courts Martial”, U.S., 1994 Ed., at Art. 99(c)(1)(b), pg. IV-34, PIN 030567-0000, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash. D.C. The details of the crimes that civilians can commit, that are classed as 'Acts of War,' cover 125 pages in the Manual of Courts Martial.
True Name of the Real Party(s) in Interest, William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey in the properly styled spelling of patronymic-named legitimate child of the patronymic parents, William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey are natural-born upon the soil within the boundaries of the United States. The Ninth Amendment Proclamation recorded within state of Idaho which designates Domicil of Choice by which Citizenship is determined.
“It has been repeatedly held that it is the Citizenship, and not the residence of the party that confers jurisdiction and gives a party the right to sue [and be sued] in the national courts.” --Haskell v. Bailey, Federal reporter, vol. 63 F 873.
The true name of William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey are NOT a “resident of this state,” and when properly identified by his or her True Name lawfully and legally are outside the de facto jurisdiction, with proper standing in the de jure state of Idaho, and beyond the reach of legal action unless as initiated and designated pursuant to the provisions of the Ninth Amendment Proclamation and the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The fact is members or considered members of Citizens of Idaho (U1777) maintain ownership of all real and personal property domiciled within the Constitutional boundaries of the state of Idaho, once evidence has been entered into a court of general jurisdiction to prevent and challenge the presumptive title of claim of the CORPORATE NAME fraudulently imposed by that CITY OF BURLEY, that CASSIA COUNTY and that STATE OF IDAHO.
The City of Burley, Cassia County and this State of Idaho must provide through discovery a controverted sworn statement in apposite along with;
Significant-connection state
The length of time the individual property was present and the duration of any absence
The location of property
The extent to which he or she has ties to the state, and or this state and or that STATE OF IDAHO
It is within the court record(s) of fact the City of Burley, Cassia County and this State of Idaho has committed the intent to defraud the Citizen of the state of Idaho as described in IC 18-102 “intent to defraud”.
The City of Burley, Cassia County and this State of Idaho have continuously failed TO PROVIDE such evidence and a protective order related to management of an adult’s property and continue to violate and usurped the powers of the people domiciled within the Constitutional boundaries of the city of Burley, county of Cassia and the state of Idaho.
That CITY OF BURLEY, CASSIA COUNTY and STATE OF IDAHO representatives have failed in there duties of office to maintain and use of any Constitutional seal on record which protects and provides judicial redress for only the Constitutional county or state; Courts of Justice.
Example(s) of what is on record currently:
STATE OF IDAHO )
Cassia County )
I hereby certify that this instrument is a full, true and correct copy of the original thereof, on file in my office.
by _____________________
STATE OF IDAHO )
CASSIA COUNTY )
I hereby certify that the within instrument was recorded. __________________ County Recorder
by _____________________
Citizens of Idaho requests and demands that the following examples be entered into the record to prove the county of Cassia and state of Idaho recorders seals have been utilized in any of the cases denoted above.
Example(s) of what is needed for the record:
State of Idaho )
Cassia County )
I hereby certify that this instrument is a full, true and correct copy of the original thereof, on file in my office.
by _____________________
state of Idaho )
county of Cassia )
I hereby certify that the within instrument was recorded. __________________ County Recorder
by _____________________
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey, discovery of the above adjudicative facts is conclusive competent evidence that establishes his or her de jure legal status which is contrary and fatal to Plaintiff’s de facto claim, whether in remedy, as an unincorporated nonprofit association as defined by I.C. Title 53 Chapter 7, or in penalty, as a quasi - municipal corporation “governing body political subdivision” as defined in I.C. section 7-1303(6), as both are commonly denominated “CITY OF BURLEY, CASSIA COUNTY and that STATE OF IDAHO” which has initiated this I.C. Title 7 chapter 13 special proceeding to which William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey, are not subject too.
This civil action quasi in rem was to be prosecuted pursuant to IC title 7 chapter 13, Judicial Confirmation Law, i.e., the I.C. 7-1302 provision whereupon the early judicial determination as to the validity of the plaintiff's claim to such action by reliance upon the I.R.O.E. 301 presumption / assertion that the designated William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey, are the “true name” of the real party in interest pursuant to I.C. Section 53-503(7)(b). This presumption is hereby purged and the fictitious plaintiff is barred from invoking and maintaining this de facto COURT’S jurisdiction.
Moreover, the above-captioned COURT is a corporate subsidiary of the “JUDICIARY COURTS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,” a mere corporation which bears the D-U-N-S #: 36-070-8499. See attached Dun and Bradstreet report, Exhibit B, which identifies JUDICIARY COURTS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO as a “company” and as a subsidiary of Idaho, State of (Inc).
“As noted, this company is a subsidiary of Idaho, State of (Inc), DUNS #07-313-3787, and reference is made to that report for background information on the parent company and its management.”
The Clearfield Doctrine is stare decisis:
“Governments descend to the level of a mere private corporation and take on the characteristics of a mere private citizen. This entity cannot compel performance upon its corporate statute or rules unless it, like any other corporation or person is the holder-in-due course of some contract or commercial agreement between it and the party upon whom the payment and performance are made and thereby, willing to produce said documents and place the same evidence before trying to enforce its demands called statutes. For purposes of suit, such corporations and individuals are regarded as entities entirely separate from government.” --Bank of U.S. v. Planters Bank, 9 Wheaton (22 US) 904, 6 L. Ed. 24.
It is indisputable, irrefutable and incontrovertible that the above-captioned COURT, which bears its own D-U-N-S number is NOT a governmental entity but is a private company and is incapable of bringing or sustaining any action or proceeding against the William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey, and is not and does not speak for, stand for, represent or act on behalf of the fictitious Defendant(s) WILLIAM COLE, DARLENE COLE, JAMES EINAR PEDERSON, GERALD WRIGHT, HAROLD DAVID BAILEY in which that CITY OF BURLEY, CASSIA COUNTY and that STATE OF IDAHO is fraudulently imposing on the sovereign Citizen domiciled within the state of Idaho.
At no time; due to the fraudulent behavior of the CORPORATE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS of this State of Idaho even allowed William Cole, Darlene Cole, James Einar Pederson, Gerald Wright, Harold David Bailey due process, evidence of Constitutional standing which must require a Court of Justice to be opened freely within this State of Idaho as described in the Idaho Constitution; Article I section 18.
It is Noted:
Defendant bears the burden of presenting a record to substantiate his arguments. State v. Langley, 115 Idaho 727,769 P.2d. 604 (Ct.App.1989).
Error will not be presumed on appeal but must be affirmatively shown by the appellant, and with limited expectations error at trial must be properly objected to and preserved to merit review. State v. Thomas, 94 Idaho 430 (1971). The exception to this rule is that an appellant court will review “fundamental error” on appeal even when no adequate objection has been interposed at trial. State v. White, 97 Idaho, 708 1976, cert.den. 429 U.S. 842,97S.Ct.118,50 L.Ed.2d.111 (1976).
Fundamental error is such error as goes to the foundation of the defendant’s rights or must go to the foundation of the case or taken from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to prevent him to waive. Each case will of necessity, under such a rule, stand on its merits. Out of facts in each case will arise the law. Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 475, n. 13 (1971).
Therefore, the question is whether the magistrate of the trial court will properly instruct the jury is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 P.2d. 691, 694 (1992) or knowingly, willfully and wantonly deny the petitioners right to due process of law within the state of Idaho which petitioner and his property is domicil within. A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to have his or her theory of the case submitted to the jury under proper instructions State v. Olsen, 122 Idaho 87, 90, 831 P.2d 555, 558 (1992).
In discussing the trial courts obligations regarding jury instructions the Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
If the theory is not supported by the evidence, then the court must reject the instruction. But if the theory is supported by the evidence, then the court must determine if the instruction is a correct statement of law. If it is a correct statement, then the instruction should be given. But if the instruction is incorrect, then the trial court is under the affirmative duty to properly instruct the jury. In this manner, the defendant is still under the obligation to bring his or her theory or theories to the attention of the trial court. The trial court is not obligated to determine on its own upon what theory or theories to instruct the jury on. It is a right to request to be heard according to his theory or theories according to the law of the state.
TITLE 18
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
CHAPTER 1
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
18-101.DEFINITION OF TERMS. The following words have in this code the signification attached to them in this section, unless otherwise apparent from the context:
7. Where the word "person" is used in this code to designate the party whose property may be the subject of any offense, it includes this state, any other state, any territory, government, or country, which may lawfully own property within this state, and all public and private corporations or joint associations, as well as individuals.
In statutes, “Person” does NOT include the sovereign. Since this state is listed here, the state does NOT act in a sovereign capacity when prosecuting under Title 18.
“...where any state proceeds against a private individual in a judicial forum it is well settled that the state, county, municipality, etc. waives any immunity to counters, cross claims and complaints, by direct or collateral means regarding the matters involved.” Luckenback v. The Thekla, 295 F 1020, 226 Us 328; Lyders v. Lund, 32 F2d 308; Dexter v. Kunglig J., 43 F2d 705, 282 US 896; U.S. v. N.C.B.N.Y., 83 F2d 236, 106 ALR 1235, Affirmed; Russia v. BTC, 4 F Supp 417, 299 US 563.
IDAHO STATUTES
TITLE 1
COURTS AND COURT OFFICIALS
CHAPTER 7
DISTRICT COURTS
1-701. DISTRICT COURTS ESTABLISHED. District courts are hereby established to be held in each of the counties of the state which have been or may hereafter be organized by law, for the purpose of hearing and determining all matters and causes arising under the laws of this state.
According to the above authorities, it is undisputed that the DISTRICT COURTS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO were established by the LEGISLATURE. Legislative courts are of an inferior nature and they are administrative agencies NOT judicial bodies:
In the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, UCLA Law Professor Emeritus Kenneth L. Karst writes:
“In essence a legislative court is merely an administrative agency with an elegant name. While Congress surely has the power to transfer portions of the business of the federal judiciary to legislative courts, a wholesale transfer of that business would work a fundamental change in the status of our independent judiciary and would seem vulnerable to constitutional attack.” --From the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, MacMillan Publishing Co. (1986), volume 3, page 1144.
In light of the above authoritative claim, as far as I am concerned, by deceiving me, and others, into thinking that the state’s legislative “DISTRICT COURTS” are constitutional courts when they are nothing more than administrative agencies, a despicable fraud is being perpetrated against the people. Case law confirms:
“When enforcing mere statutes, judges of all courts do not act judicially, (and thus are not protected by “qualified” or “limited immunity,”) --SEE: Owen v. City, 445 U.S. 662; Bothke v. Terry, 713 F2d 1404) but merely act as an extension as an agent for the involved agency -- but only in a “ministerial” and not a “discretionary capacity...” Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 583; Keller v. P.E., 261 US 428; F.R.C. v. G.E., 281, U.S. 464.
". . . judges who become involved in enforcement of mere statutes (Public or Private, civil or criminal in nature), act as mere "clerks" of the involved agency..." K.C. Davis., ADMIN. LAW, Ch. 1 (CTP. West’s 1965 Ed.)
Legislative Courts: The Canter Case
American Ins. Co. v. Canter
1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 511 (1828)
Legislative courts, so-called because they are created by Congress in pursuance of its general legislative powers, have comprised a significant part of the federal judiciary. HYPERLINK \l "f45"45 The distinction between constitutional courts and legislative courts was first made in American Ins. Co. v. Canter, HYPERLINK \l "f46"46 which involved the question of the admiralty jurisdiction of the territorial court of Florida, the judges of which were limited to a four-year term in office. Said Chief Justice Marshall for the Court: ''These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3rd article of the Constitution, but is conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses over the territories of the United States.'' HYPERLINK \l "f47"47 The Court went on to hold that admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the States only in those courts which are established in pursuance of Article III but that the same limitation does not apply to the territorial courts, for in legislating for them ''Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government.'' HYPERLINK \l "f48"48
Canter postulated a simple proposition: ''Constitutional courts exercise the judicial power described in Art. III of the Constitution; legislative courts do not and cannot.'' HYPERLINK \l "f49"49 A two-fold difficulty at tended this proposition, however. Admiralty jurisdiction is included within the ''judicial power of the United States'' specifically in Article III, requiring an explanation how this territorial court could receive and exercise it. Second, if territorial courts could not exercise Article III power, how might their decisions be subjected to appellate review in the Supreme Court, or indeed in other Article III courts, which could exercise only Article III judicial power? HYPERLINK \l "f50"50 Moreover, if in fact some ''judicial power'' may be devolved upon courts not having the constitutional security of tenure and salary, what prevents Congress from undermining those values intended to be protected by Article III's guarantees by giving jurisdiction to non-protected entities that, being subjected to influence, would be bent to the popular will?
Attempts to explain or to rationalize the predicament or to provide a principled limiting point have from Canter to the present resulted in ''frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents'' spelled out in cases comprising ''landmarks on a judicial 'darkling plain' where ignorant armies have clashed by night''. HYPERLINK \l "f51"51 Nonetheless, Article I courts are quite usual entities in our judicial system. HYPERLINK \l "f52"52
HYPERLINK \l "t45"[Footnote 45] In Freytag v. CIR, HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=501&invol=868"501 U.S. 868 (1991), a controverted decision held Article I courts to be ''Courts of Law'' for purposes of the appointments clause. Art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2. See id., 888-892 (majority opinion), and 901-914 (Justice Scalia dissenting).
HYPERLINK \l "t46"[Footnote 46] HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=26&invol=511"26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
HYPERLINK \l "t47"[Footnote 47] Id., 546.
HYPERLINK \l "t48"[Footnote 48] In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=370&invol=530" \l "544"370 U.S. 530, 544 -545 (1962), Justice Harlan asserted that Chief Justice Marshall in the Canter case ''did not mean to imply that the case heard by the Key West court was not one of admiralty jurisdiction otherwise properly justiciable in a Federal District Court sitting in one of the States. . . . All the Chief Justice meant . . . is that in the territories cases and controversies falling within the enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts constituted without regard to the limitations of that article. . . .''
HYPERLINK \l "t49"[Footnote 49] Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=458&invol=50" \l "106"458 U.S. 50, 106 (1982) (Justice White dissenting).
HYPERLINK \l "t50"[Footnote 50] That the Supreme Court could review the judgments of territorial courts was established in Durousseau v. United States, HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=10&invol=307"10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 307 (1810). See also Benner v. Porter, HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=50&invol=235" \l "243"50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 243 (1850); Clinton v. Englebrecht, HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=80&invol=434"80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434 (1872); Balzac v. Porto Rico, HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=258&invol=298" \l "312"258 U.S. 298, 312 -313 (1922).
HYPERLINK \l "t51"[Footnote 51] Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=458&invol=50" \l "90"458 U.S. 50, 90 , 91 (1982) (Justice Rehnquist concurring). The ''darkling plain'' language is his attribution to Justice White's historical summary.
HYPERLINK \l "t52"[Footnote 52] In addition to the local courts of the District of Columbia, the bankruptcy courts, and the U. S. Court of Federal Claims, considered infra, these include the United States Tax Court, formerly an independent agency in the Treasury Department, but by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Sec. 951, 83 Stat. 730, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7441, made an Article I court of record, the Court of Veterans Appeals, Act of Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4105, 38 U.S.C. Sec. 4051, and the courts of the territories of the United States. Magistrate judges are adjuncts of the District Courts, see infra, n. 105, and perform a large number of functions, usually requiring the consent of the litigants. See Gomez v. United States, HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=490&invol=858"490 U.S. 858 (1989); Peretz v. United States, HYPERLINK "http://www.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=501&invol=923"501 U.S. 923 (1991). The U. S. Court of Military Appeals, strictly speaking, is not part of the judiciary but is a military tribunal, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 867, although Congress designated it an Article I tribunal and has recently given the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over its decisions.
Here is the clear and unambiguous statement of legislative intent regarding the operation of
the "laws" [Statutes] of the corporation called "STATE OF IDAHO:"
Idaho Code 9-303. STATUTES -- CLASSIFICATION -- PUBLIC OR PRIVATE.
Statutes are public or private. A private statute is one which concerns only certain designated individuals, and affects only their private rights. All other statutes are public, in which are included statutes creating or affecting corporations.
It is a conclusive presumption, grammatically, and according to law, that only corporations created by the State are affected by the public statutes. A real party in interest did not derive his or her existence entirely, or in any way, from the law; A real party in interest was not created by the State, and is NOT a corporation; therefore, not affected by public statutes.
The IDAHO CASE below further proves, by the entry in the Compiler’s Notes to Idaho Code 9-102, that the phrase “in which are included” as used in I.C. 9-303 is not, and cannot, by Rule of Law, be expansive.
Inclusio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius.
"Where a statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others. Peck v. State, 63 Idaho 375, 120 P.2d 820 (1941); Meader v. Unemployment Comp. Div. of Indus. Accident Bd., 64 Idaho 716, 136 P.2d 984 (1943).
A maxim of the law is well defined:
"A maxim of law is an established principle or proposition. A principle of law universally admitted, as being just and consonant. They are principles and authorities, and part of the general customs or common law of the land; and are of the same strength as acts of parliament. [or of a legislature.] Maxims of the law are holden for law, and all other cases that may be applied to them shall be taken for granted. The alterations of any of the maxims of the common law are dangerous." [Emphasis mine.] Bouvier’s Law Dictionary.
A maxim of law is an established principle or proposition. A principle of law universally admitted, as being a correct statement of the law, or as agreeable to natural reason. Coke defines a maxim to be a ‘conclusion of reason,’ and says that it is so called ‘quia maxima ejus dignitas et certissima auctoritas, et quid maxime omnibus probetur’. Co. Litt. 11a. He says in another place: ‘A maxime is a proposition to be of all men confessed and granted without proofe, argument, or discourse’." Id. 67a.
Due process of law. Law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice. Due process of law in each particular case means such an exercise of the powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs. --Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., page 500:
"When brought into Court by its Corporate name, its existence as a Corporation is admitted. See Mud Creek Drain Co. v State, 43 Ind. 157; Johnson v. Gibson, 73 Ind. 282; Ewing v. Robeson, 15 Ind. 26; Callender v. Railroad Co, 11 Ohio St. 516; Com. Ins. Etc. Co. v Taylor, 8 S.C. 107. Compare Ware v. St. Louis Bagging and Rope Co., 47 Ala. 667."
CORPORATE NAME (FULL CAPS ONLY) vs. True Name
IDAPA – Idaho Administrative Procedures Act
IDAPA 34 TITLE 04 CHAPTER 02
34.04.02 - CORPORATE NAME AVAILABILITY
000.LEGAL AUTHORITY. The Secretary of State is authorized under Section 67-903, Idaho Code, to adopt rules. (7-1-93)
001. -- 010.(RESERVED).
011.GENERAL.
01. Characters of Print Acceptable in Names. Names may consist of letters of the English Alphabet, Arabic Numerals and certain symbols capable of being reproduced on a standard English language typewriter, or combination thereof. (7-1-93)
Letters of the English Alphabet includes only upper case, or capital letters; no distinction as to type face or font is recognized. (7-1-93)
True Name
A true name is a HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Name" \o "Name" name of a thing or being that expresses, or is somehow identical with, its true HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nature" \o "Nature" nature. The notion that HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language" \o "Language" language, or some specific HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sacred_language" \o "Sacred language" sacred language, refers to things by their true names has been central to HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_(paranormal)" \o "Magic (paranormal)" magic, religious HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invocation" \o "Invocation" invocation and mysticism ( HYPERLINK "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mantra" \o "Mantra" mantras) since antiquity.
IDAHO STATUTES
TITLE 53
CHAPTER 5
53-503. DEFINITIONS. When used in this chapter, the terms defined in this section shall have the following meanings:
(7) "True name" shall have the following meanings:
When applied to an individual, the name which the individual uses to bind himself or herself to legal obligations, or to obtain privileges, licenses or benefits from government. The true name will include the surname and some combination of given names or initials, and may include other identifiers such as "Jr.," "3d" or "III."
15 USC § 1122. Liability of United States and States, and instrumentalities and officials thereof
(b) Waiver of sovereign immunity by States
Any State, instrumentality of a State or any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune, under the eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or nongovernmental entity for any violation under this chapter.
(c) Remedies
In a suit described in subsection (a) or (b) of this section for a violation described therein, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for the violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in a suit against any person other than the United States or any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, corporation, or other person acting for the United States and with authorization and consent of the United States, or a State, instrumentality of a State, or officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Such remedies include injunctive relief under section 1116 of this title, actual damages, profits, costs and attorney’s fees under section 1117 of this title, destruction of infringing articles under section 1118 of this title, the remedies provided for under sections 1114, 1119, 1120, 1124 and 1125 of this title, and for any other remedies provided under this chapter.
15 USC § 1126. International conventions
(b) Benefits of section to persons whose country of origin is party to convention or treaty
Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks, trade or commercial names, or the repression of unfair competition, to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of a mark is otherwise entitled by this chapter.
(g) Trade or commercial names of foreign nationals protected without registration
Trade names or commercial names of persons described in subsection (b) of this section shall be protected without the obligation of filing or registration whether or not they form parts of marks.
(i) Citizens or residents of United States entitled to benefits of section
Citizens or residents of the United States shall have the same benefits as are granted by this section to persons described in subsection (b) of this section.
15 USC § 1127. Construction and definitions; intent of chapter
The term “person” and any other word or term used to designate the applicant or other entitled to a benefit or privilege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as a natural person. The term “juristic person” includes a firm, corporation, union, association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of law.
The term “person” also includes the United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, or any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States. The United States, any agency or instrumentality thereof, and any individual, firm, or corporation acting for the United States and with the authorization and consent of the United States, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
The term “person” also includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof
used by a person
A Citizen with Constitutional standing requires while demanding the lower court to adhere to rule of law and allow for the defense of the petitioner AND ANY CASE to be heard by the jury of his peers 1 STAT 51 “statues at large” and not by a DE FACTO CORPORATE JURY OF THE CORPORATE STATE OF IDAHO EIN 82-6000852, 82-6000952. To Constitutionally rely upon this State of Idaho to prevent that STATE OF IDAHO from violating the State of Idaho Constitution, the hierarchy of documents within this state as defined under IDAPA is the duty of any employee, elected official, law enforcement officer and to maintain sovereignty by adhering
to the rule of law of the state of Idaho and United States.
USURPERS of Constitutional Judicial Jurisdiction:
1. G. RICHARD BEVAN, RICK BOLLAR, MICHAEL R. CRABTREE, MICK HODGES, CASEY U. ROBINSON employed at FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IDAHO (Single Location) D-U-N-S® Number: 833068732, 1459 OVERLAND AVE, BURLEY, ID 83318
Violations of Oath of Office by only enforcing CORPORATE PUBLIC STATUTES and denial of Due process of law, private statutes of the state where defendants are domiciled, the Constitution of the state and United states:
A. Failure to open Courts of Justice in this state according to Idaho Constitution.
Plain errors throughout the proceedings.
Failure or refusal of magistrate to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law on every ruling, order or denial of appellant’s pleadings.
Failure or refusal of magistrate to dismiss the case by denial of claims, supported by exhibits, under the Clearfield Doctrine. Also raises a federal question.
Denial of improper unconstitutional style of process of complaint and other pleadings by the STATE. The STATE is not a “proper party.”
Failure or refusal to acknowledge the true name of the real party in interest and to proceed by misnomers, capitonyms and corporate names by collusive joinder. Also raises a federal question.
Failure or refusal to acknowledge the distinctions between the “state of Idaho,” the “State of Idaho” and “STATE OF IDAHO” as clearly denominated throughout the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Statutes, and Idaho Court Rules, including, but not limited to I.C.R. Rule 1.
Failure or refusal of the party alleging jurisdiction, (personal, subject matter and territorial) to provide a definite statement of the allegation of jurisdiction as required and demanded, and failure or refusal to prove said jurisdiction on the record after direct challenge.
Denial of appellant’s theory of the case.
Failure or refusal of the magistrate to acknowledge the proceeding as a civil action, not a criminal action as denominated in the Idaho Constitution.
Original jurisdiction with the United States supreme Court when “STATE” is a party.
Failure or refusal of the magistrate to recognize special appearances de bene esse.
Failure or refusal of magistrate to dismiss the fatally defective complaints.
Denial of claim of legislative court not capable of receiving judicial power. Not a court of record; court did not proceed in the course of the common law. Judge denied common law venue as described under Idaho Statute 73-116.
Denial of claim of violation of separation of powers regarding prosecutor from judicial department and occupying a county office established by the legislature but prohibited by the Idaho Constitution.
Denial of every pleading, paper, exhibit, evidence, notice and demand and objections and challenges to jurisdiction throughout the proceedings, and without reasons or written orders.
Denial of trial by jury; denial of fair and impartial jury; denial of jury instructions; denial of voir dire. Also raises federal questions.
Denial of due process, including, but not limited to, denial of assistance of counsel of choice. Also raises a federal question. Attorney representation only for military court martial.
Denial of Accrued Rights under Idaho Statute 73-106.
Denial of Private law under Idaho statutes 9-303.
Denial of Personal property deemed to follow the individuals domicile and governed by such as stated under Idaho statutes 55-401.
state of Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Section 1 “rights of man” Section 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 19, 21 and 22
state of Idaho Constitution, Article 3, Section 1 "Enacting Clause", Section 25 “oath of office”
state of Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 1 "prohibits feigned issues" "criminal or civil actions only", Section 13 “Respecting Courts”, Section 19 “special laws prohibited”
state of Idaho Constitution, Article 21, Section 7 “constitution takes effect” 20 “adoption of federal constitution”
Without a valid complaint any judgement or sentence rendered is "void ab initio" Ralph v. Police Court of El Cerrito, 190 P.2d 632, 634, 84 Cal. App. 2d 257 (1984)
An indictment or complaint in a criminal case is the main means by which a court obtains subject-matter jurisdiction, and is " the jurisdiction instrument upon which the accused stands trial" State v. Chatmon, 671 P.2d 531, 538 (Kan. 1983)
2. 'ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS, employed at SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
D-U-N-S ® number: 782743116, 451 W. STATE BOISE ID 83702-6057,
Violations of Oath of Office by only enforcing CORPORATE PUBLIC STATUTES and denial of Due process of law, private statutes of the state where defendants are domiciled; the Constitution of the state and United states:
state of Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Section 1 “rights of man” Section 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 19, 21 and 22
state of Idaho Constitution, Article 3, Section 1 "Enacting Clause", Section 25 “oath of office”
state of Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 1 "prohibits feigned issues" "criminal or civil actions only", Section 13 “Respecting Courts”, Section 19 “special laws prohibited”
state of Idaho Constitution, Article 21, Section 7 “constitution takes effect”, 20 “adoption of federal constitution”
Without a valid complaint any judgement or sentence rendered is "void ab initio" Ralph v. Police Court of El Cerrito, 190 P.2d 632, 634, 84 Cal. App. 2d 257 (1984)
An indictment or complaint in a criminal case is the main means by which a court obtains subject-matter jurisdiction, and is " the jurisdiction instrument upon which the accused stands trial" State v. Chatmon, 671 P.2d 531, 538 (Kan. 1983)
That CORPORATE CITY, COUNTY and STATE have violated these Idaho statutes by only maintaing that CORPORATE side of the Jurisdiction to be heard, brought forth by your CORPORATE NAME while preventing the Senior Judge to hear Constitutional standing by changing the oath of Office.
Idaho Statutes IC 7-1303(3) "proves 2 forms of government exist at all times"
Idaho Statutes IC 39-9003 “ proves dejure standing exists to decline Obama Health care”
Idaho Statutes IC 1-2213(1) "pursuant to law"
Idaho Statutes IC 19-3942 “Trial on Appeal”
Idaho Statutes IC 73-106 "accrued rights"
Idaho Statutes IC 73-116 "common law enforced"
Idaho Statutes IC 9-102 "questions of law"
Idaho Statutes IC 18-2901 “ false imprisonment defined”
Idaho Statutes IC 19-202(a) “legal jeopardy”
Idaho Statutes IC 18-3001(2) “false personation”
Idaho Statutes IC 18-2403(E(4,7,9) “theft”
Idaho Statutes IC 18-3601 “forgery defined”
Idaho Statutes IC 18-102 “intent to defraud”
Idaho Statutes IC 18-5401 “perjury”
Idaho Statutes IC 18-5402 “oath defined”
Idaho Statutes IC 18-5409 “punishment for perjury”
Idaho Statutes IC 18-5410 “subornation of perjury”
Idaho Statutes IC 18-7805 “racketeering”
Idaho Statutes IC 9-303 "statutes public or private"
Idaho Statutes IC 9-308 "oral evidence"
Idaho Statutes IC 9-309 “conclusiveness”
Idaho Statutes IC 9-321 “public or private record how proved”
Idaho Statutes IC 9-325 “certified copies of writings”
Unauthorized Practice of Law – Idaho
TITLE 3
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
CHAPTER 4
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE IDAHO STATE BAR
3-401. Purpose of chapter. Recognizing that the practice of the legal profession is a privilege granted by the state and not a natural right of the individual, it is deemed necessary as a matter of business policy and in the interests of the public to provide laws and provisions covering the granting of that privilege and its subsequent use, control and regulation to the end that the public shall be properly protected against unprofessional, improper and unauthorized practice of law and unprofessional conduct of members of the bar.
History:
[(3-401) 1923, ch. 211, sec. 1, p. 343; I.C.A., sec. 3-401.]
3-405. Member of the Idaho State Bar defined. All persons who have been heretofore, or shall hereafter be, duly admitted to practice law before the supreme court of this state, and who have not been disbarred or suspended therefrom, and who shall have paid the license fee in this chapter provided for, and all attorney magistrates, judges of the district court and court of appeals, and supreme court justices of this state, and of the district court of the United States for Idaho, are hereby declared to be members of the Idaho state bar.
History:
[(3-405) 1923, ch. 211, sec. 4A, as added by 1925, ch. 89, sec. 8, p. 124; I.C.A., sec. 3-405; am. 2010, ch. 27, sec. 1, p. 47.]
3-410. Receipts and license -- Issuance. The secretary of the board shall issue a receipt to each person paying said license fee and shall, if such person shall have theretofore been admitted to practice law in this state by the Supreme Court and not disbarred or then under suspension, thereupon issue to such person a license in such form as the board shall prescribe, for the year for which license fees were paid.
History:
[(3-410) 1923, ch. 211, sec. 9A, as added by 1925, ch. 90, sec. 2, p. 128; I.C.A., sec. 3-410; am. 1970, ch. 117, sec. 2, p. 279.]
3-415. Rights of accused member. Any member of the Idaho State Bar complained of shall have notice and opportunity to defend by the introduction of evidence and the examination of witnesses called against him, and the right to be represented by counsel. He shall also have the right to summon witnesses to appear and testify or produce books, papers, documents or other writings necessary or material to his defense in like manner as provided in section HYPERLINK "http://legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title3/T3CH4SECT3-414.htm" 3-414. In case of suspension or disbarment from practice the accused shall have the right to have the order of the board reviewed by the Supreme Court.
History:
[(3-415) 1923, ch. 211, sec. 14, p. 343; I.C.A., sec. 3-415.]
3-420. Unlawful practice of law -- Penalty. If any person shall, without having become duly admitted and licensed to practice law within this state or whose right or license to practice therein shall have terminated either by disbarment, suspension, failure to pay his license or otherwise, practice or assume to act or hold himself out to the public as a person qualified to practice or carry on the calling of a lawyer within this state, he shall be guilty of an offense under this act, and on conviction thereof be fined not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500), or be imprisoned for a period of not to exceed six (6) months, or both, and if he shall have been admitted to practice law he shall in addition be subject to suspension under the proceedings provided by this act.
History:
[(3-420) 1923, ch. 211, sec. 17, p. 343; am. 1925, ch. 89, sec. 6, p. 124; I.C.A., sec. 3-420.]
3-104. Practicing without license a contempt -- Exception. If any person shall practice law or hold himself out as qualified to practice law in this state without having been admitted to practice therein by the Supreme Court and without having paid all license fees now or hereafter prescribed by law for the practice of law he is guilty of contempt both in the Supreme Court and district court for the district in which he shall so practice or hold himself out as qualified to practice. Provided, that any person may appear and act in a magistrate's division of a district court as representative of any party to a proceeding therein so long as the claim does not total more than $300, and so long as he or his employer has no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation, and that he shall do so without making a charge or collecting a fee therefor.
History:
[(3-104) C.C.P. 1881, sec. 119; R.S., R.C., & C.L., sec. 3996; C.S., sec. 6571; am. 1929, ch. 63, sec. 3, p. 92; I.C.A., sec. 3-104; am. 1969, ch. 278, sec. 1, p. 821.]
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Pursuant to Section VIII of the Idaho Bar Commission Rules, 800 et seq., Bar Counsel has the authority to investigate complaints of unauthorized practice of law under the direction of the Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law.
Under I.B.C.R. 801(i), the unauthorized practice of law is the practice of law without being duly qualified to do so, as prohibited by statute, court rule, or case law of the State of Idaho.
If you believe that someone has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Idaho, you may make a complaint by submitting a written statement, preferably on a HYPERLINK "http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/bar_counsel/bc_complaint_form.pdf" Bar Counsel Complaint Form, to:
Bar Counsel’s Office
Idaho State Bar
P.O. Box 895
Boise, ID 83701
Unauthorized Practice of Law Links
HYPERLINK "http://isb.idaho.gov/general/rules/ibcr.html" Idaho Bar Commission Rules Section VIII, 800 – 809, Unauthorized Practice of Law
HYPERLINK "http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title3/T3CH4.htm" Title 3, Idaho Code §3-401 and §3-420
HYPERLINK "http://isb.idaho.gov/general/rules/irpc.html" Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.5
HYPERLINK "http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/general/legasst.pdf" Model Guidelines for the Utilization of Legal Assistant Services, Resolution 94-7
Some Idaho Cases Related to the Unauthorized Practice of Law
In Re: Matthews, 57 Idaho 75, 62 P.2d 578, (1936)
In Re: Matthews, 58 Idaho 772, 79 P.2d 535, (1938)
Idaho State Bar v. Meservy, 79 Idaho 526, 325 P.2d 688, (1958)
Idaho State Bar v. Meservy, 80 Idaho 504, 335 P.2d 62, (1959)
Idaho State Bar v. Villegas, 126 Idaho 191, 879 P.2d 1124, (1994)
State v. Wees, 138 Idaho, 119, 58 P.3d 803, (2002)
State v. Bettwieser, 143 Idaho 857, 149 P.3d 857, (2006)
Idaho
State Bar v. Villegas, 879 P.2d 1124 (Idaho 1994)
This Court has defined the practice of law as:
'The doing or performing services in a court of justice, in any matter depending [sic] therein, throughout its various stages, and in conformity with adopted rules of procedure. But in a larger sense, it includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be depending [sic] in a court.'
Idaho State Bar v. Meservy, 80 Idaho 504, 508, 335 P.2d 62, 65 (1959) (emphasis in original) (quoting In re Matthews, 57 Idaho 75, 83, 62 P.2d 578, 584 (1936)). Idaho
===================
IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT:
RULE 5.5: UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.
(b) A lawyer admitted to practice in another jurisdiction, but not in this jurisdiction, does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law in this jurisdiction when:
(1) the lawyer is authorized by law or order, including pro hac vice admission pursuant to Idaho Bar Commission Rule 222, to appear before a tribunal or administrative agency in this jurisdiction or is preparing for a potential proceeding or hearing in which the lawyer reasonably expects to be so authorized;
[RULE 222. Immunity.
(a) Testimony and other presentation, evidence, arguments or objections submitted to any member of the Board, hearing officer, special master, any member of the CF Committee, any member of the RA Committee, the Executive Director or Bar Counsel, during all proceedings and conduct maintained or engaged in under the Admission Rules, and all testimony and showings with respect to any such matters, shall be absolutely privileged and no civil litigation thereon may be instituted or maintained.
(b) Members of the Board, CF Committee, RA Committee, hearing officers, special masters, Executive Director, Admissions Director, Bar Counsel, and members of their respective staffs shall be immune, as available under any applicable law, from civil suit and damages for any conduct or occurrence in the course of or arising out of the performance of any duties in connection with the Admission Rules.]
or, (2) other than engaging in conduct governed by paragraph (1):
(i) a lawyer who is an employee of a client acts on the client’s behalf or, in connection with the client’s matters, on behalf of the client’s commonly owned organizational affiliates;
(ii) the lawyer acts with respect to a matter that arises out of or is otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer’s representation of a client in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice; or
(iii) the lawyer is associated in the matter with a lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction who actively participates in the representation.
(c) A lawyer shall not assist another person in the unauthorized practice of law.
Commentary
[1] A lawyer may regularly practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. The practice of law in violation of lawyer-licensing standards of another jurisdiction constitutes a violation of these Rules. This Rule does not restrict the ability of lawyers authorized by federal statute or other federal law to represent the interests of the United States or other persons in any jurisdiction.
[2] There are occasions in which lawyers admitted to practice in another jurisdiction, but not in this jurisdiction, will engage in conduct in this jurisdiction under circumstances that do not create significant risk to the interests of their clients, the courts or the public. Paragraph (b) identifies four situations in which the lawyer may engage in such conduct without fear of violating this Rule. This Rule does not address the question of whether other conduct constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. The fact that conduct is not included or described in this Rule is not intended to imply that such conduct is the unauthorized practice of law. With the exception of paragraph (b)(2)(i), nothing in this Rule is intended to authorize a lawyer to establish an office or other permanent presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice here.
[3] Lawyers not admitted to practice generally in the jurisdiction may be authorized by law or order of a tribunal or an administrative agency to appear before the tribunal or agency. Such authority may be granted pursuant to formal rules governing admission pro hac vice or pursuant to informal practice of the tribunal or agency. Under paragraph (b)(1), a lawyer does not violate this Rule when the lawyer appears before such a tribunal or agency. Nor does a lawyer violate this Rule when the lawyer engages in conduct in anticipation of a proceeding or hearing, such as factual investigations and discovery conducted in connection with a litigation or administrative proceeding, in which an out-of-state lawyer has been admitted or in which the lawyer reasonably expects to be admitted. Nothing in paragraph (b)(1) is intended to authorize a lawyer not licensed in this jurisdiction to solicit clients in this jurisdiction.
[4] When lawyers appear or anticipate appearing before a tribunal or administrative agency with authority to admit the lawyer to practice pro hac vice, their conduct is governed by paragraphs (a) and (b)(1) and not by (b)(2). Paragraph (b)(2) authorizes a lawyer to engage in certain conduct other than making or preparing for appearances before such a tribunal. For example, paragraph (b)(2)(i) recognizes that some clients hire a lawyer as an employee in circumstances that may make it impractical for the lawyer to become admitted to practice in this jurisdiction. Given that these clients are unlikely to be deceived about the training and expertise of these lawyers, lawyers may act on behalf of such a client without violating this Rule. The lawyer may also act on behalf of the client's commonly owned organizational affiliates but only in connection with the client's matters. Lawyers authorized to practice under this paragraph may be subject to registration or other requirements, including assessments for client protection funds and mandatory continuing legal education.
[5] Paragraph (b)(2)(ii) recognizes that the complexity of many matters requires that a lawyer whose representation of a client consists primarily of conduct in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice, also be permitted to act on the client's behalf in other jurisdictions in matters arising out of or otherwise reasonably related to the lawyer's representation of the client. This conduct may involve negotiations with private parties, as well as negotiations with government officers or employees, and participation in alternative dispute-resolution procedures. This provision also applies when a lawyer is conducting witness interviews or other activities in this jurisdiction in preparation for a litigation or other proceeding that will occur in another jurisdiction where the lawyer is either admitted generally or expects to be admitted pro hac vice.
[6] Paragraph (b)(2)(iii) recognizes that association with a lawyer licensed to practice in this jurisdiction is likely to protect the interests of both clients and the public. The lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction, however, may not serve merely as a conduit for an out-of-state lawyer but must actively participate in and share actual responsibility for the representation of the client. If the admitted lawyer's involvement is merely pro forma, then both lawyers are subject to discipline under this Rule.
[7] The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. Paragraph (c) does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3.
[8] Lawyers may also provide professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of law; for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government agencies. Lawyers may assist independent nonlawyers authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide particular legal services, for example, paraprofessionals authorized to provide some kinds of legal services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se.
[9] Nothing in this rule is intended to conflict with Idaho Bar Commission Rule 222, which provides for pro hac vice admission of lawyers from other jurisdictions. [See Rule 222 above]
Model Guidelines For The Utilization Of Legal Assistant Services
While their content varies, their purpose appears uniform: to provide lawyers with a reliable basis for delegating responsibility for performing a portion of the lawyer’s tasks to legal assistants.
Guideline 1: A lawyer is responsible for all of the professional actions of a legal assistant performing legal assistant services at the lawyer’s direction and should take reasonable measures to ensure that the legal assistant’s conduct is consistent with the lawyer’s obligations under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Guideline 2: Provided the lawyer maintains responsibility for the work product, a lawyer may delegate to a legal assistant any task normally performed by the lawyer except those tasks proscribed to one not licensed as a lawyer by statute, court rule, administrative rule or regulation, controlling authority, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or these Guidelines.
Comment to Guideline 2:
The essence of the definition of the term legal assistant adopted by the ABA Board of Governors in 1986 is that, so long as appropriate supervision is maintained, many tasks normally performed by lawyers may be delegated to legal assistants. Of course, Rule 5.5 of the Model Rules, DR 3-101 of the Model Code, and most states specifically prohibit lawyers from assisting or aiding a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. Thus, while appropriate delegation of tasks to legal assistants is encouraged, the lawyer may not permit the legal assistant to engage in the “practice of law.” Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code define the “practice of law.” EC 3-5 under the Model Code gave some guidance by equating the practice of law to the application of the professional judgment of the lawyer in solving clients’ legal problems. Further, ABA Opinion 316 (1967) states: “A lawyer can employ lay secretaries, lay investigators, lay detectives, lay researchers, accountants, lay scriveners, nonlawyer draftsmen or nonlawyer researchers. In fact, he may employ nonlawyers to do any task for him except counsel clients about law matters, engage directly in the practice of law, appear in court or appear in formal proceedings as part of the judicial process, so long as it is he who takes the work and vouches for it to the client and becomes responsible for it to the client.”
Guideline 3: A lawyer may not delegate to a legal assistant:
a) Responsibility for establishing an attorney-client relationship.
b) Responsibility for establishing the amount of a fee to be charged for a legal service.
Responsibility for a legal opinion rendered to a client.
Model Rule 1.4. Ethical Consideration 3-6 under the Model Code emphasized that “delegation [of legal tasks to nonlawyers] is proper if the lawyer maintains a direct relationship with his client, supervises the delegated work and has complete professional responsibility for the work product.”
Guideline 4: It is the lawyer’s responsibility to take reasonable measures to ensure that clients, courts, and other lawyers are aware that a legal assistant, whose services are utilized by the lawyer in performing legal services, is not licensed to practice law.
Guideline 5: A lawyer may identify legal assistants by name and title on the lawyer’s letterhead and on business cards identifying the lawyer’s firm.
Guideline 6: It is the responsibility of a lawyer to take reasonable measures to ensure that all client confidences are preserved by a legal assistant.
Guideline 7: A lawyer should take reasonable measures to prevent conflicts of interest resulting from a legal assistant’s other employment or interests insofar as such other employment or interests would present a conflict of interest if it were that of the lawyer.
Guideline 8: A lawyer may include a charge for the work performed by a legal assistant in setting a charge for legal services.
Comment to Guideline 8:
The U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S.274 (1989), held that in setting a reasonable attorney’s fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1988, a legal fee may include a charge for legal assistant services at “market rates” rather than “actual cost” to the attorneys. This decision should resolve any question concerning the propriety of setting a charge for legal services based on work performed by a legal assistant. Its rationale favors setting a charge based on the “market” rate for such services, rather than their direct cost to the lawyer.
Accordingly, the effect of combining a market rate charge for the services of lawyers and legal assistants should, in most instances, result in a lower total cost for the legal service than if the lawyer had performed the service alone.
Guideline 9: A lawyer may not split legal fees with a legal assistant nor pay a legal assistant for the referral of legal business. A lawyer may compensate a legal assistant based on the quantity and quality of the legal assistant’s work and the value of that work to a law practice, but the legal assistant’s compensation may not be contingent, by advance agreement, upon the profitability of the lawyer’s practice.
Guideline 10: A lawyer who employs a legal assistant should facilitate the legal assistant’s participation in appropriate continuing education and pro bono publico activities.
Disclosure of Professional Liability Insurance
HYPERLINK "http://isb.idaho.gov/general/rules/ibcr.html" Idaho Bar Commission Rule 302(a)(5) HYPERLINK "http://isb.idaho.gov/general/acrobatreaderisb.html" requires each lawyer admitted to the active practice of law to certify to the Idaho State Bar on or before February 1 of each year (1) whether the lawyer represents private clients; (2) if the lawyer represents private clients, whether the lawyer is currently covered by professional liability insurance; and (3) whether the lawyer intends to maintain insurance during the next twelve months. Each lawyer admitted to the active practice of law in this jurisdiction who reports being covered by professional liability insurance shall identify the primary carrier and shall notify the Idaho State Bar in writing within 30 days if the insurance policy providing coverage lapses, is no longer in effect, or terminates for any reason, unless the policy is renewed or replaced without substantial interruption. Note - All active members are required to disclose their professional liability insurance information, but they are not required to obtain or maintain professional liability insurance.
Resignation
An attorney who does not intend to meet licensing requirements may voluntarily resign his or her membership in the Bar by submitting a written request to the Executive Director on a form provided by the Bar: HYPERLINK "http://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/licensing/vol_resign.pdf" Voluntary Resignation Form. An attorney with pending disciplinary matters may not voluntarily resign without Bar Counsel approval.
HYPERLINK "http://isb.idaho.gov/licensing/licensing.html#ins" http://isb.idaho.gov/licensing/licensing.html#ins
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
APPROVED JULY 3, 1890
ARTICLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
SECTION 1. DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT. The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
ARTICLE V
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
SECTION 13. POWER OF LEGISLATURE RESPECTING COURTS. The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with this Constitution, provided, however, that the legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be not less than the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced.
TITLE 1
COURTS AND COURT OFFICIALS
CHAPTER 18
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
1-1802. Judge cannot act as attorney. A judge cannot act as attorney or counsel in a court in which he is judge, or in an action or proceeding removed therefrom to another court for trial or review, or in an action or proceeding from which an appeal may lie to his own court.
History:
[(1-1802) C.C.P. 1881, sec. 60; R.S., R.C., & C.L., sec. 3901; C.S., sec. 6500; I.C.A., sec. 1-1802.]
1-1803. Supreme and district judges. A justice of the Supreme Court or judge of the district court cannot act as attorney or counsel in any court, except in an action or proceeding to which he is a party on the record.
History:
[(1-1803) C.C.P. 1881, sec. 61; R.S., R.C., & C.L., sec. 3902; C.S., sec. 6501; I.C.A., sec. 1-1803.]
TITLE 3
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
CHAPTER 2
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS
3-201. Duties of attorneys. In addition to such duties as the Supreme Court may by rule prescribe, it is the duty of the attorney and counselor:
1. To support the constitution and laws of the United States and of this state.
2. To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.
3. To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses only as appear to him legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a public offense.
4. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never seek to mislead the judges by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.
5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his clients.
6. To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.
7. Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding from any motive of passion or interest.
8. Never to reject for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
History:
[(3-201) C.C.P. 1881, sec. 120; R.S., R.C., & C.L., sec. 3997; C.S., sec. 6572; am. 1929, ch. 63, sec. 4, p. 92; I.C.A., sec. 3-201.]
3-202. Authority of attorney. An attorney and counselor has authority:
1. To bind his client in any of the steps of an action or proceeding, by his agreement filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise.
2. To receive money claimed by his client in an action or proceeding during the pendency thereof, or after judgment, unless a revocation of his authority is filed, and upon the payment thereof, and not otherwise, to discharge the claim or acknowledge satisfaction of the judgment.
History:
[(3-202) C.C.P. 1881, sec. 121; R.S., R.C., & C.L., sec. 3998; C.S., sec. 6573; I.C.A., sec. 3-202.]
=============
DEFINITION OF PRACTICE OF LAW
Idaho State Bar v. Villegas, 879 P.2d 1124 (Idaho 1994)
This Court has defined the practice of law as:
'The doing or performing services in a court of justice, in any matter depending [sic] therein,
throughout its various stages, and in conformity with adopted rules of procedure. But in a larger
sense, it includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts by
which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be depending [sic] in a
court.'
Idaho State Bar v. Meservy, 80 Idaho 504, 508, 335 P.2d 62, 65 (1959) (emphasis in original)
(quoting In re Matthews, 57 Idaho 75, 83, 62 P.2d 578, 584 (1936)).
It is the duty to maintain a just and open court of justice governed by the rule of law which this state Judiciary has failed to maintain within the Judicial system of this state.
Prosecuting Attorneys, Mayor, City Council, Zoning who are employed by CITY OF BURLEY INC., D-U-N-S® Number: 182046151, 1918 OVERLAND AVE, BURLEY, ID. 83318
Violations of Oath of Office Violations of Oath of Office by only enforcing CORPORATE PUBLIC STATUTES and the use of the true name, denial of private statutes of the state where defendants are domiciled the Constitution of the state and United states; and ordinance “ Section 1. All ordinances of a general and permanent nature of the City of Burley are hereby revised, codified, and complied pursuant to law under the name of the BURLEY CODE.” “Which this is in total opposite of the rule of law, when both are in apposite jurisdictional standing.“pursuant to law = Constitutional / BURLEY CODE = CORPORATE POLICY”
CASSIA COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT, D-U-N-S® Number: 833720162, 129 East 14th Street, BURLEY, ID. 83318
Violations of Duties of Office and Oath of Office by only enforcing CORPORATE PUBLIC STATUTES and denial of private statutes, the protection of the Constitution of the state and United states and failure of IC 31-2227. ENFORCEMENT OF PENAL LAWS -- PRI MARY
RESPONSIBILITY. Irrespective of police powers vested by statute in state, county, and municipal officers, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Idaho that the
primary duty of enforcing all the penal provisions of any and all statutes of this state, in any court, is vested in the sheriff and prosecuting attorney of each of the several counties.
By creating a position where an individual life was taken “Patrick Hawley in 2003 which the CITY AND COUNTY will not release any public records to date, what are they hiding?” due to abuse of discretion by such officers of the CORPORATE CITY, COUNTY, and STATE.
CASSIA COUNTY, LARRY A. MICKELSEN, DEE YEAMAN, JOSEPH W. LARSEN, COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ALFRED BARRUS “Headquarters” D-U-N-S® Number: 028433647, 1459 OVERLAND AVE, BURLEY, ID 83318
By not maintaining control of the Constitutional court of record and allowing the CORPORATE MAGISTRATES to dictate what he or she shall do or not do, Violations of Oath of Office, No Constitutional Seals, due to only enforcing CORPORATE PUBLIC STATUTES and denial of private and or public statutes of the state, the Constitution of the state and United states and failure of IC 31-2227:
ENFORCEMENT OF PENAL LAWS -- PRI MARY RESPONSIBILITY. Irrespective of police powers vested by statute in state, county, and municipal officers, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Idaho that the primary duty of enforcing all the penal provisions of any and all statutes of this state, in any court, is vested in the sheriff and prosecuting attorney of each of the several counties.
1. Whereas the Clerk failed to maintain the records of the court properly as stated in Idaho Statute 1-1001.
Whereas the Clerk failed to maintain the records of the court properly is liable under Idaho Statute 1-1003.
Whereas the Clerk failed to maintain the seals for the Constitutional county of Cassia.
Whereas the Clerk failed to maintain the seals for the Constitutional state of Idaho.
Whereas the Clerk failed to maintain and update the repository in regards to all cases.
Whereas the County Prosecutor lied, failed to respect and follow the laws of this state while NOT protecting the county and state sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
LET IT BE KNOWN: The issue before this state Court is simply the Jurisdiction; SUBJECT MATTER of the use of Quasi in Rem CORPORATE NAME in relation, as well property in rem and the JURISDICTION over the NAME DEFENDANT, not the NATURE AND CAUSE.
It is the duty of the Attorney general of the state to find in favor of this Quo Warranto on behalf of the people of the county of Cassia and the state of Idaho and to stop further abuse by CORPORATE POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS who are continually violating the liberties of the Citizens of Idaho (U1777) who are properly domiciled within the constitutional state of Idaho governed under a republic form of Government guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution and the United States Constitution.
There is no need to change the law, as you the Attorney General have suggested in the past, when in truth and fact; the State of Idaho must follow it’s own statutes, Constitution, Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, United States Constitution; instead of usurping the jurisdiction of the Courts of Justice of the sovereign state of we the people.
A member or considered member of Citizens of Idaho (U1777) must have Constitutional Protection under the law of domicile; Constitutions of the state of Idaho and United states, USC and statutes of this state which protect religious beliefs known as creed; if you willfully; wantonly and knowingly fail to provide any written rebuttal with certified copies of evidence inapposite of this Quo Warranto against the STATE parties involved for usurpation of power against the sovereign county of Cassia and the state of Idaho then the creation of our great state is simply a tool of CORPORATE SLAVERY. Which violates all men(s) and or women(s) free will to coexist; where no injury to an individual or property has occurred; yet punished for political correctness within a forced DEMOCRACY of CORPORATE PRESUMPTION.
M. Esquibel a member of Citizens Of Idaho (U1777) TO BE SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN BELOW, declares under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing Quo Warranto is true, correct and complete to the best of my knowledge set forth above.
State of Idaho )
) ss: Intervener ________________________________________
county of Bonneville ) M. Esquibel dejure citizen of the state of Idaho
Subscribed and sworn to me this _________ day of ______________________ , 2013.
___________________________________________
Notary Public, State of Idaho
Commission expires: _______________________
TO:FILE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
P.O. Box 87320
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Main
Washington, D.C. 20530
CC
CLERK OF THE COURT
1459 OVERLAND AVE, BURLEY, ID 83318
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
1459 OVERLAND AVE, BURLEY, ID 83318
CITY OF BURLEY INC.
CLERK / MAYOR / PROSECUTING ATTORNEY / CITY COUNCIL
1918 OVERLAND AVE, BURLEY, ID. 83318
CASSIA COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT
129 East 14th Street, BURLEY, ID. 83318
IDAHO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
317 WEST MAIN STREET
BOISE, IDAHO, 83735-0660
ATTORNEY GENERAL WASDEN continues to laugh at the people of the state of Idaho; while supporting the INTENT to FRAUD the people who desire and require Justice!
Proof the AG OFFICE IS A PRIVATE FIRM
CLICK on Both Pictures Below
